

Agency Information

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RECORD SERIES : INDEX CARDS

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OPERATION MONGOOSE

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157-10011-10008

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8 Dec 93

(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CARTER, MARSHALL

KAMCHATKA

~~FIREBELL~~

DATES:

9/20/62

CATEGORIES:

SPECIAL GROUP

OCCURRENCE: Special Group meeting on 20 September, the proposed use of ~~FIREBELL~~ against KAMCHATKA was disapproved. The A-DCI raised the possibility of using this ~~vehicle~~ against Cuba, but no decision was made, although the Group appeared favorably inclined.

SOURCE: Memorandum by Carter, 9/21/62 (02637)

STAFF: WALLACH

FILE:

DATE: 7/2/75

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
<u>CARD 3</u>		<u>Card 3 of 3</u>

OCCURRENCE: (continued from Memo for the Special Group re: Cuba Project, Jan. 24, 1962
detectives and foreign police officials." (00106)

In regard to Task #7 of General Lansdale's review this memo notes, "Moreover, the development of a resistance movement will not remain controllable, so that operational time tables produced during the next four weeks can serve only as guides for a proposed sequence of actions." (00107)

The memorandum notes that six men to form the initial nucleus for work for inside Cuba have been assessed in depth. Fifteen locations have been selected as suitable centers for resistance. It was also noted that in support of State's efforts, CIA has conducted propaganda operations including a number of mass demonstrations in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,

~~Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.~~

<u>SOURCE:</u>	<u>STAFF:</u>
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u>

TOP SECRET

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(U)(A)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
PRES. KENNEDY, HARVEY, TAYLOR <i>Daq</i>	MAY 7, 1962	MONGOOSE, SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED

OCCURRENCE: Memo: "I reported to higher authority the substance of Mr. HARVEY'S briefing of the SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED on 3 MAY 1962, pointing out the very limited progress which has been made and the uncertainty of the ultimate effectiveness of our program. I mentioned the DUGOUT incident as indicative of the morale problem. It was agreed we would continue along the present lines until the terminal date of the present phase in August."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: MEMO FOR RECORD, REPORT OF PROGRESS TO HIGHER
AUTHORITY, MAY 7, 1962, MAXWELL D. TAYLOR (00024)
FILE: _____

STAFF: DiGencova
DATE: 7/2/75

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8 Dec 93
(1)(B)
(1)(C)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
HELMS ✓PRESIDENT KENNEDY MCCONE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD	July 25, 1962	SPECIAL GROUP MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: Helms notes that McCone briefed the panel of the President's foreign intelligence advisory board on political action projects. He pointed out that "each project must have his approval to the circulation to the members of the Special Group". For example, reconnaissance overflights are now approved. [He noted covert financial support in Peruvian, Greek, Finnish, Italian, and Brazilian elections.] Helms "read to the panel a paper on the operation Mongoose which the Director had used earlier in the day for giving a briefing to the President."

SOURCE: Memorandum for the record, re meeting on CA matters with the panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board of Helms, dated July 25, 1962 (00870)
FILE:

STAFF: diGenova
DATE: 7/2/77

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8 Dec 73

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(C)}

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
JFK ✓ Maxwell Taylor	27 Sept 62	Special Group Aug- mented MOONGOOSE Diem /

OCCURRENCE:

Taylor states that the Special Group and the Special Group Augmented considered a proposal by CIA for covert activities designed to harass the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This had been prepared in response to a request by the Sec.'s of State and Defense.

Taylor added that the Special Group asked that a more detailed operation plan be prepared. It was agreed that Defense make certain equipment and personnel available to CIA in support of this program. An elint flight designed to identify the North Vietnamese radar order of battle, so as to permit planning over flight routes was authorized. This will be flown out of Saigon, using the specially equipped aircraft available on Taiwan, but with the Chinese Air Force markings removed, and employing Chinese Nationalists pilots documented South Vietnamese citizens.

SOURCE: Maxwell Taylor's memorandum for the President, dated Sept 27, 1962. (000950)

STAFF: PGW

FILE:

DATE: 6/29/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
PRESIDENT KENNEDY ✓ BUNDY
ROBERT KENNEDY
HELMS
RUSK
MCNAMARA

DATES:
Nov. 12, 1963

MONGOOSE

PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL

OCCURRENCE:

On November 12, 1963 a meeting on "Cuban Operations" was held with "Higher Authority" (President-Kennedy). Present were Mr. RUSK, Mr. MCNAMARA, Mr. ROBERT KENNEDY, Mr. BUNDY, Mr. MCCONE, Mr. JOHNSON, Mr. KILPAGRICK, Mr. VANCE, Mr. HELMS, Mr. FITZGERALD, MR. CHAMBER, Mr. STEAKLEY. Mr. MCCONE gave a brief summary of recent developments inside Cuba and Mr. Fitzgerald reported on Cuban operations under six main headings. (Mr. FITZGERALD's discussions of these headings is contained in separate cards.)

SOURCE:

Memorandum for the record dated Nov. 12, 1963
FILE: "Cuban Operations"

STAFF:

DATE: Kelley
6/28/75

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10 Dec 93

(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

PRESIDENT KENNEDY ✓
ROBERT KENNEDY ✓
HELMS
RUSK

DATES:

Nov. 12, 1963

CATEGORIES:MONGOOSE
PRESIDENTIAL APPROVALOCCURRENCE:

On NOV. 12, 1963, Mr. Fitzgerald reported to the President that the United States economic denial program is contributing to Cuba's declining economy, but would be more effective if the Canadians would be willing to cooperate.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SOURCE:

Memorandum for record dated Nov. 12, 1963

FILE: "Cuban Operations"

STAFF:DATE: Kelley
6/28/75

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10 Dec 93
(1)(2)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>		<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
McCone	Nhu		
Colby	Hillsman		
Kennedy, John F.	Tung		DIEM
McNamarra	Diem		
Lodge			

~~TOP SECRET~~

OCCURRENCE: In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with the CIA participants being McCone and Colby the record by Colby reflects that McNamorra pointed out that Lodge has little contact with Diem and has not been out of Saigon. Mr. McCone commented that he believed that we should move cautiously, that we should talk seriously to Diem and that Lodge should be urged to visit the countryside to obtain a more realistic view of the effects of suspending aid. Mr. McCone also suggested that another approach be made to Nhu to seek his cooperation in a departure. The President asked whether we had carefully studied the detail effects of cuts in aid (as proposed in a paper prepared by Hillsman). It was evident that the effects had not been studies. The President asked DOD and CIA to analyze the Hillsman paper. He also asked that a telegram be sent to Lodge asking him to try to reduce the press leakage from Saigon and to establish some real contact with Diem. Any current plans for aid negotiation should be stalled, and the President should be well informed of any steps taken in this context such as the instance involving CIA payment to Col Tung last week.

FILE: IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 21-22
DATE: Dawson
6/27/75

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JG
10 Doc 93

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PERSONS/ENTITIES:

SMITH, DAVID	MCCONE
HARKINS, GENERAL	HELMS
TRUEHARD, WILLIAM	COLBY
KENNEDY, ROBERT	
KENNEDY, JOHN F.	✓

CATEGORIES:

DATE:	Oct. 29, 1963
UP	SECRET
DEPT	SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam on October 29, 1963 with MCCONE, HELMS, AND COLBY in attendance. The following record by HELMS and COLBY shows that: it was suggested that in the Ambassador's absence, HARKINS, TRUEHART, and DAVID SMITH act as a committee to direct a coup operation. MCCONE countered with the view that SMITH should not be involved in such a policy-making function, although he would be in a position to provide technical advise to HARKINS and TRUEHART as well as carry out their instructions in the operations field. The President stated that if the forces in Saigon were not clearly in favor of the coup we should discourage its launching. The Attorney General felt the U.S. was risking too much based on flimsy evidence. The DCI stated his view that even a successful coup would create a period of interregnum, confusion which might only be solved by a second or third coup.

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38

STAFF:

DATE: Dawson
FILE: 6/27/75

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(1)(B)
(1)(C)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED MONGOOSE, TAYLOR, RFK, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, CARTER, LEMNITZER, LANSDALE, CLINE, PARROTT	July 12, 1962 July 20, 1962 April 9, 1963	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE (CARD ONE OF TWO)

<u>OCCURRENCE:</u>	Lansdale briefed the group on numbers of agents in Cuba. Air resupply proposal submitted by CIA "should be deferred pending broader review of the entire situation." Taylor noted if urgent need for air supply proposal could be made to the Special Group Augmented at any time. "Mr. McCone emphasized that no high-level penetrations of the Cuban government have yet been attained." "The Attorney General inquired about the status of popular support for Castro, and also the possibility of a revolt against him." Lansdale replied, "There is no rallying point for active opposition." The AG and Johnson emphasize need to obtain hard intelligence on subversive activities by Castro in the hemisphere. A complete review of MONGOOSE was set toward the end of July. Taylor emphasized need for summaries of results "and a statement of future alternatives open to the U.S. should be developed." Looking into proposal to subsidize Japanese purchases of Dominican sugars so that the Japanese could divert these purchases from Cuba. McCone said that his experts had informed him that from a legal point of view, CIA could use unvoiced funds to support an operation of this kind. He cautioned,
<u>SOURCE:</u>	Memo for the record, Minutes of the Special Group (Augmented) meeting 12 July 1962 re: Operation MONGOOSE, (00031-00032)
<u>FILE:</u>	STAFF: (continued) di Genova DATE: July 2, 1975

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JL 10 Dec 83
(i)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Zogby Harvey Bissell Kennedy, Robert ✓ HALPERN	1961 October,	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Halpern testified that in the fall of 1961 he attended a meeting with Bissell and Mr. [redacted] Zogby. Zogby was the Branch Chief (8). The meeting occurred in the middle of Octo of 1961. Bissell stated at the meeting that he had recently "been chewed out in the cabinet room of the White House by both the President and the Attorney General for as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro regime. His orders to both [redacted] Zogby and to me [redacted] to plan an operation to accomplish that end." (8) Halpern testified that no limitations were put on the term "get rid of". Nothing was forbidden (8). The meeting involved only general discussions and not tactics.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:	STAFF:
Halpern 6/18/75	Rhea
FILE:	DATE: 7/1/75

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JF 10 Dec 93
(u)(c8)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
BUNDY, GENERAL DECKER, MR. MURROW RFK, GENERAL LANSDALE, MARTIN GENERAL HARRIS, WILLIAM BUND, GENERAL CARTER	9/6/62	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE
OCCURRENCE:		

Meeting of SGA On Operation MONGOOSE, 6 September 1962. Discussion of LANSDALE's suggestion #32 (agricultural sabotage). GENERAL CARTER emphasized the extreme sensitivity of any such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from something going wrong particularly if there were obvious attribution to the U.S. He went on to say, however, that it would be possible to accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in the paper. He mentioned specifically the possibility of producing crop failures ^{by} ~~the introduction~~ of biological agents which would appear to be of natural origin. BUNDY said that he had no worries about any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as a result of local Cuban dissatisfaction or a natural disaster, but that we must avoid external activities such as release of chemicals, etc. unless ^{they could} SOURCE be completely covered up.

SGA MONGOOSE Minutes 9/6/62 (00045-00046)
FILE: Cage

PGW
DATE: June 29, 1962

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PERSONS/ENTITIES:

WALT ELDER, RFK, GENERAL LANSDALE,
MCGEORGE BUNDY, BRUCE CHEEVER (CIA)

DATES:

9/14/62

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE
Special Group Augmented

OCCURRENCE:

CIA Headquarters and all WH stations are to be especially to alert for any shipments of arms or other subversive material from Cuba to other Latin American countries-- Chief, Task Force W says this alert has been laid on and is in force.

SOURCE:
Memorandum for the record on MONGOOSE meeting, 14 Sept 1962-
Walt Elder

FILE: Cage 6649

STAFF: PGW

DATE: June 30, 1975

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<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
Walt ELDER, RFK, GENERAL LANSDALE, MCGEORGE BUNDY, BRUCE GHEEVER (CIA),	9/14/62	MONGOOSE Special Group Augmented
<u>OCCURRENCE:</u>		
Possibility of sabotage of VICKERS spare parts allegedly ready for shipment to Cuba by Canada is being looked into - Chief, Task Force W says this activity is underway.		

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u>	<u>STAFF:</u>
Memorandum for the record on MONGOOSE meeting, 14 Sept 1962- Walt Elder	PGW
FILE: Cage 00049	DATE: June 30, 1975

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(1) (A)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
WALT ELDER	RFK	MONGOOSE
GENERAL LANDDALE	9/14/62	Special Group Augmented
MCGREGOR BUNDY		
BRUCE CLEELAND (CIA)		
<u>OCCURRENCE:</u>		

The 12 September addendum to the Phase III MONGOOSE operations was discussed and the entire Phase II was approved in principle as a platform from which to proceed. Activities which may be especially sensitive are to be brought before the group, and this body wishes to be kept generally advised on progress.

<u>SOURCE:</u> Memorandum for the record on MONGOOSE meeting, 14 Sept 1962- (00049) <u>FILE:</u> Cage	<u>STAFF:</u> PGW <u>DATE:</u> June 30, 1975
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10 Dec 73
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<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
WALT ELDER, RFK, GENERAL LANSDALE MCGEORGE BUNDY, BRUCE CHEEVER (CIA)	9/14/62	MONGOOSE Special Group Augmented

OCCURRENCE:

This memorandum reports that the ATTORNEY GENERAL "expressed concern that activities by certain Cuban exiles are reaching the point where the government may be forced to take action against them rather than to simply state that "we are investigating." The agency is requested to see what it can do to help the noise level of these activities.

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u> Memorandum for the record on MONGOOSE meeting. Walt Elder (00818) FILE: Cage	<u>STAFF:</u> PGW	<u>DATE:</u> June 30, 1975
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10 DEC 93
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
NESTOR SANCHEZ Robert F. KENNEDY ✓ AMLASH-1	Oct. 11, 1963	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

~~Nestor Sanchez~~ (a Spanish-speaking case officer from Headquarters , acting as case officer for AMLASH-1) cabled that AMLASH-1 "was insistent upon meeting with a senior U.S. official, preferably Robert F. KENNEDY, for assurances of U.S. moral support" (88)—for AMLASH-1's activities—in-Guba. ~~SANCHEZ~~ recommended—that—"Highest and profound consideration be given" (88) because AMLASH-1 was determined to attempt an operation against Castro "with or without U.S. support" (88).

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:	IG REPORT 1967	STAFF:	F Baron
FILE:	7/1/75	DATE:	

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10 Dec 13
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Desmond FITZGERALD AMLASH Nestor SANCHEZ	Oct. 29, 1963 Nov. 13, 1963	Castro
Robert KENNEDY HELMS		Card 1 of 2
TOP SECRET		
OCCURRENCE: (CARD 1)		
Desmond FITZGERALD, Chief of SAS, met with AMLASH, using Nestor SANCHEZ as interpreter. (88-89). The cover of the "contact plan for the meeting, a copy of which is in the AMLASH file," (89) read as follows: "FITZGERALD will represent self as personal representative of Robert F. KENNEDY, who traveled Paris for specific purpose meeting (AMLASH) and giving him assurances of full U.S. support if there is change of the present government in Cuba." (89)		
According to FITZGERALD, he discussed the planned meeting with the DD/P (HELMs) who decided it was not necessary to seek approval from Robert KENNEDY for FITZGERALD <u>To speak in his name, (89) [emphasis added]</u>		STAFF: F Baron DATE: 7/1/75
SOURCE: IG REPORT 1967		FILE:

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
SANCHEZ Fitzgerald AMLASH	Oct. 29, 1963 Nov. 13, 1963	Castro <i>Card 262</i>
<u>OCCURRENCE:</u>	(CARD 2)	
		In a memorandum [by SANCHEZ] on November 13, 1963, it was reported that "FITZGERALD informed [AMLASH] that the U.S. is prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-Communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership." (89) Despite the fact that SANCHEZ reported that "nothing of an operational nature was discussed at the FITZGERALD meeting" (90), FITZGERALD recalled that AMLASH-1 "spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination weapon. In particular, he wanted a high-powered rifle with telescopic sights or some other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance." (90) FITZGERALD said that he told AMLASH "that the U.S. Government would have no part of an attempt on CASTRO's life. (90) However, the SANCHEZ memorandum reported "After the meeting [AMLASH] stated that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now wanted to know what technical support we could provide him." (90)
<u>SOURCE:</u>	IG REPORT 1967	<u>STAFF:</u> F. Baron
<u>FILE:</u>		<u>DATE:</u> 7/1/75

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10 Dec 73
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
SOURCE: [REDACTED] HARKINS, GENERAL TRUEHARD, WILLIAM KENNEDY, ROBERT ✓ KENNEDY, JOHN F.	DATE: Oct. 29, 1963 UP SPOTLIGHT	STAFF: Dawson DATE: 6/27/75

OCCURRENCE:
In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam on October 29, 1963 with MCCONE, HELMS, AND COLBY in attendance. The following record by HELMS and COLBY shows that: it was suggested that in the Ambassador's absence, HARKINS, TRUEHARD, and [REDACTED] act as a committee to direct a coup operation. MCCONE countered with the view that [REDACTED] should not be involved in such a policy making function, although he would be in a position to provide technical advise to HARKINS and TRUEHARD as well as carry out their instructions in the operations field. The President stated that if the forces in Saigon were not clearly in favor of the coup we should discourage its launching. The Attorney General felt the U.S. was risking too much based on flimsy evidence. The DCI stated his view that even a successful coup would create a period of interregnum, confusion which might only be solved by a second or third coup.

SOURCE: IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38

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PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT KENNEDY ✓ HELM GILLEVER STEAKLEY	Nov. 5, 1963	CASTRO MONGOOSE SPECIAL GROUP

OCCURRENCE:

Note that the minutes of the Special Group meeting on November 5, 1963 contain an underscored item on page 1 stating "see special minutes for additional items." This item appears on page 1 under a discussion of Cuban sabotage and infiltration operations.

SOURCE:	STAFF:	
Minutes of Special Group meeting dated Nov. 6, 1963.	Kelley	DATE: 6/28/75

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10 Dec 93

(1) (3)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

PRESIDENT KENNEDY ✓
ROBERT KENNEDY
HELMS
RUSK

BUNDY
MCNAMARA

DATES:

Nov. 12, 1963

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE
PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL

OCCURRENCE:

On Nov. 12, 1963, Mr. Fitzgerald reported to the President that the United States economic denial program is contributing to Cuba's declining economy, but would be more effective if the Canadians would be willing to cooperate.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SOURCE:

Memorandum for record dated Nov. 12, 1963
FILE: "Cuban Operations"

STAFF:

DATE: Kelley

6/28/75

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PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
PRESIDENT KENNEDY		
ROBERT KENNEDY		
BUNDY		
HELM'S		MONGOOSE
RUSK		PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL
MCNAMARA		
OCCURRENCE:		

On November 12, 1963 a meeting on "Cuban Operations" was held with "Higher Authority" (President Kennedy). Present were Mr. RUSK, Mr. MCNAMARA, Mr. ROBERT KENNEDY, Mr. BUNDY, Mr. MCCONE, Mr. JOHNSON, Mr. KILPAGRICK, Mr. VANCE, Mr. HELMS, Mr. FITZGERALD, ~~MR. TICHEEVER~~, Mr. STEAKLEY. Mr. MCCONE gave a brief summary of recent developments inside Cuba and Mr. Fitzgerald reported on Cuban operations under six main headings. (Mr. FITZGERALD's discussions of these headings is contained in separate cards.)

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SOURCE:	STAFF:
Memorandum for the record dated Nov. 12, 1963	Kelley
FILE: "Cuban Operations"	DATE: 6/28/75

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<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
Desmond FITZGERALD	Oct. 29, 1963	
AMLASH	Nov. 13, 1963	Castro
Néstor SÁNCHEZ		
Robert KENNEDY ✓		
HELMs		
TOP SECRET		
<u>OCCURRENCE:</u> (CARD 1)		

Desmond FITZGERALD, Chief of SAS, met with AMLASH, using Néstor SÁNCHEZ as interpreter.
 (88-89). The cover of the "contact plan for the meeting, a copy of which is in the
 AMLASH file," (89) read as follows:

"FITZGERALD will represent self as personal representative of Robert F. KENNEDY,
 who traveled Paris for specific purpose meeting (AMLASH) and giving him
 assurances of full U.S. support if there is change of the present government
 in Cuba." (89)

According to FITZGERALD, he discussed the planned meeting with the DD/P (HELMs)
 who decided it was not necessary to seek approval from Robert KENNEDY for FITZGERALD
to speak in his name. (89) (emphasis added)

SOURCE:

STAFF:

F Baron

DATE:

7/1/75

IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
SANCHEZ		
FITZGERALD	Oct. 29, 1963	Castro
AMLASH	Nov. 13, 1963	Card 2 of 2

OCCURRENCE: (CARD 2)

In a memorandum by ~~SANCHEZ~~ on November 13, 1963, it was reported that "FITZGERALD informed [AMLASH] that the U.S. is prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-Communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership." (89) Despite the fact that ~~SANCHEZ~~ reported that "nothing of an operational nature was discussed at the FITZGERALD meeting" (90), FITZGERALD recalled that AMLASH-1 "spoke-repeatedly-of-the-need-for-an-assassination-weapon." In particular, he wanted a high-powered rifle with telescopic sights or some other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance." (90) FITZGERALD said that he told AMLASH "that the U. S. Government would have no part of an attempt on CASTRO's life. (90) However, the ~~SANCHEZ~~ memorandum reported "After the meeting [AMLASH] stated that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now [AMLASH] know what technical support we could provide him." (90)

<u>SOURCE:</u>	IG REPORT 1967	<u>STAFF:</u>	E. Baron
<u>FILE:</u>	TOR SANCHEZ	<u>DATE:</u>	7/1/75

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JF 13 Dec 93

(1) (A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MCCONE HELM'S BUNDY ✓R. KENNEDY	Mar 2, 1964	Special Group Mongoose

OCCURRENCE: Helms states that agency officers have reported plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government leaders. Agency officers told Cubans that U.S. would not condone the planned actions. Plans included: Cuban exile approach to March 2, 1964 by businessman to discuss a plan which was "still in the embryonic state to assassinate Fidel Castro." Businessman has underworld connections with Cosa Nostra. Latter group-has-offered-to-assassinate Castro for \$150,000. Proposes to use 5 men.

March 3, 1964 meeting in which [Byron Cameron] says he met an unidentified group which would be willing to assassinate selected Cuban officials for cash. Specifically the [Cameron] group is interested in assassinating Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Ernesto Che Guevara. [Cameron] knows that he can indicted for conspiracy.

SOURCE: Memorandum for DCI McCone from Richard Helms re
plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government
leaders, June 10, 1964 (03105-031110)

STAFF:
diGenova
DATE:
7/3/75

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 RELEASE OR THIS DOCUMENT
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 13 Dec 93
 (1) (A)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
MCCONE	8/19/64	SGA
FITZGERALD	7/30/64	MONGOOSE
YPAPICH	7/10/64	CASTRO
RFK		TOP SECRET
STEAKLEY		TOP SECRET
JMWAVE		TOP SECRET
VANCE		TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64, "It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICO of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116) The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director, (116) which was disseminated-to-the-Spec.-Asst.-to-the-Pres.-for-Natl.-Security-Affrs.; ASst.-Sect.-for-Intelli-American Affairs, Dept. of State; Dir. of Intellic. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report "related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was \$150,000. JOSE MARIO PEPIN approached the Chief of ~~BOSCH~~ Preso of Bacardi Rum would contribute \$50,000. ~~BOSCH~~ approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence.
SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from MCNAUL to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvw with the alleged participants "Obviously nothing came of the plot." (117)
FILE:

IG REPORT 1967

Baron, 7/1/75

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(1) (A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		CATEGORIES:	
MC CONE	FITZGERALD	HUGHES	SGA
BUNDY	PAPICH	ROSENSTEIN	MONGOOSE
JESSUP	RFK	ROSENSTEIN	CASTRO
STEAKLEY	JMWAVE		TOP SECRET
JMWAVE	VANCE		TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64, "It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director; (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affairs.; Asst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs, Dept. of State; Dir. of Intellic. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report "related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was \$150,000. [JOSE MARIO DEPIN] [BOSCH] [Presso of Bacardi-Rum] approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence." SOURCE Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from [McNAMEE] to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI interviews with the alleged participants. "Obviously nothing came of the plot." (117)

IG REPORT 1967

Baron, 7/1/75

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(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE	FITZGERALD	HUGHES
BUNDY	OPAPICH	OBOSCHI, JOSE
JESSUP	RFK	
STEAKLEY	JMWAVE	
JMWAVE	VANCE	

DATES:

8/19/64
7/30/64
6/10/64

CATEGORIES:

SGA
MONGOOSE
CASTRO

~~TOP SECRET~~

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64, "It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICO of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director, (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security-Affairs.; Asst.-Sect. for International Affairs, Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report "related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was \$150,000. - JOSE MARIO REPIN, BOSCHI, Preso. of Bacardi Rum would contribute \$50,000. BOSCHI approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence. SOURCE Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from MEADE to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvw with the alleged participants "Obviously nothing came of the plot." (117)

DATE:

IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

baron, 7/1/75

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<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>		<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
MURPHY	LYMAN	<u>DATE(S):</u> 4/23/63
KILPATRICK ✓	GASTRO-	<u>CUBA</u>
SEEON	CASTRO'S SISTER	<u>SPECIAL GROUP</u>
FITZGERALD		

OCCURRENCE: Murphy asked Fitzgerald whether Castro's immediate entourage had been penetrated. Fitzgerald replied that ~~Castro's Sister~~ worked for us, but ~~that she~~ didn't always have inside information.

<u>SOURCE:</u>	Memorandum, dated 4/23/63, prepared by Lyman and Kilpatrick.	<u>STAFF:</u>	WILLIACH
<u>FILE:</u>		<u>DATE:</u>	7/2/75

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13 Dec 93
(1)(b)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
JOHNSON KILPATRICK✓ MCCONE	Sept. 16, 1963	MONGOOSE SPECIAL GROUP

OCCURRENCE:

On September 16, 1963 a memorandum reported that "all members of the special group have approved project **GARAGE** (having to do with certain **ELINT** activities in the area of Cuba.)"

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u> Memorandum dated 16 September 1963 for members of the Special Group from Mr. Parrott	<u>STAFF:</u> Kelley
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u> 6/28/75

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JG 13 Dec 23
(1) (A)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>		<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
Edwards	Gomez	11/62	Castro
King	O'Connell		
Bannerman	O'Connell		

OCCURRENCE:

O'Connell testified that when EDWARDS was on leave, once, KING spoke to Robert BANNERMAN (Who was not witting of Castro project) and O'Connell had to tell BANNERMAN that B. was not "privy" to project. O'Connell was embarrassed. (Tr. 36, 99-100). No one but KING, not Gomez or ~~O'Connell~~, knew (100).

SOURCE:

Testimony of James P. O'Connell, 5/30/75

FILE:

STAFF:

John Rayly

DATE: 6/30/75

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13 Dec 93
(1)(A)

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

KING, J. C. ✓ HARVEY
IG REPORT EDWARDS
BISSELL
HALPERN

DATES:

May 23, 1967

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO

OCCURRENCE:

The following sources of information were used in preparing the IG REPORT of 1967: (1) Files: Furnished for review by the Director of Security, the Deputy Director for Support, the General Counsel, the Legislative Counsel, the Chief of WH Division, and by Col. J. C. KING, former Chief of WH Division. Also, the Director of Central Reference furnished biographic files and intelligence publications. (2) Interviews: Desmond Fitzgerald, Sam Halpern, [Bruce Cheever], J. C. King, Alfonso Rodriguez, J. D. Esterline, Edward Gunn, Howard Osborn, James O'Connell, Sidney Gottlieb, Sheffield Edwards, Richard Bissell, Lawrence Houston, [Ray Treichler], John Warner, [Nestor Sanchez], William Harvey, Cornelius Roosevelt, Robert Bannerman, [Henry Bortner], Richard Ober.

SOURCE: IG REPORT, 1967

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 7/2/75

TOP SECRET

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JG 19 Dec 63
(U)(A)
(C)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
KIRKPATRICK	11/14/62	
DDP	Nov. 21, 1962	Special Group Augmented
Mr. Halpern		Operation Mongoose
Gen. Lansdale		Cuba
Walter Elder		
DCI		

OCCURRENCE: With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the penultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephone conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and [Cheever] a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and [Cheever] which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandum. I have discussed this matter in detail with [Cheever] and clearly recollects that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA and ANGORD teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to [Cheever] recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which SOURCE: would logically have led to the discussions at the time STAFF of the Matahambre operation."

Paul Wallach
DATE: July 1, 1975

Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)

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JG 13 Dec 93
(1)(A)
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
KIRKPATRICK	11/14/62	
DDP	Nov. 21, 1962	Special Group Augmented
Mr. Halpern		Operation Mongoose
Gen. Lansdale		Cuba
Walter Elder		
DCI	10/30/62	

OCCURRENCE: With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the penultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and [Cheever] which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7-and-8-of-my-reference-memorandum. I have discussed this matter in detail with [Cheever] and clearly recollects that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA [and AMFORID] teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to [Cheever], any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which recollection, would logically have led to the discussions at the time STAFF: SOURCE: of the Matahambre operation."

Paul Wallach

DATE:

July 1, 1975

Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)
FILE:

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13 Dec 73
J
(1)(A)
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
KIRKPATRICK	11/14/62	
William Harvey	Nov. 21, 1962	Special Group Augmented
Gen. Lansdale		Operation Mongoose
Walter Elder		Cuba
DCI	10/30/62	

OCCURRENCE: With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the penultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation-on-the-evening-of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and [REDACTED] which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandum. I have discussed this matter in detail with [REDACTED] and clearly recollects that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA and [REDACTED] teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to [REDACTED] recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which SOURCE: would logically have led to the discussions at the time STAFF of the Matahambre operation."

Paul Wallach	DATE: July 1, 1975
Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)	FILE:

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13 Dec 73

(1)(c)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
LANSDALE	Mar 2, 1962 Nov 30, 1961	Special Group Mongoose

OCCURRENCE: Lansdale traces the history of the project from its inception on Nov. 30, 1961 through March 1, 1962. Under the latter date, he notes, "The Chief of Operations /Lansdale/is to report to the President through the Special Group (NSC 5413 Augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS); the Special Group will be responsible for providing policy guidance for approving important operations, and for monitoring progress." (00181) Lansdale also submitted an intelligence plan for basic intelligence collection upon which to base the decision to undertake actions to cause the overthrow of Castro. The plan itself at pages 00183 through 00187 included establishing intelligence agents inside Cuba; collecting intelligence from Cubans inside the United States; counterfeiting ration cards and currency inside of Cuba; geographical surveys of air fields, military installations, communications centers; attempts to place trained agents inside the government organizations or to defect officials "in place"; and negotiating for British help in contaminating lubricants and fuels to cripple Cuban transportation. The British want to know, "How serious are you?" before risking their assets to help the U.S. (00180-00187)

SOURCE: Program review by Brig. Gen. Lansdale, Mar 2, 1962
on the Cuba Project (00180-00187)

FILE:

STAFF:
di Genova
DATE: June 30, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:

(continuation)

Card 2 of 4

OCCURRENCE: CARD 2

meeting of foreign ministers which opened January 22, 1962. The object was to get wide Western Hemisphere support for OAS resolutions condemning Cuba and isolating it from the rest of the hemisphere. "The OAS meeting is to be supported by public demonstrations in Latin America, generated by CIA and a psychological campaign assisted by USIA." The major task of the diplomatic capability was to encourage Latin American leaders to develop independent operations similar to the instant project seeking an internal revolt of the Cuban people against the Communist regime. In the economic warfare area an embargo on Cuban trade was to be considered after the OAS meeting. The CIA was unable to undertake the action to sabotage the sugar harvest which commences about January 15 and upon which Cuba's one-crop economy depended. Sabotage of transport, mills, sugar sacking in cane fields was explored, according to Lansdale's review. Special sabotage support was noted.→

SOURCE:STAFF:FILE:DATE:

TOP SECRET

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
(continuation)		Card 3 of 4

OCCURRENCE: CARD 3
 "CIA has initiated action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results (stoppage of some Cuban transports) is not expected until mid-1962. CIA is introducing [redacted] "Hubzol," a corrosive additive to Cuban locomotive diesel fuel oil through commercial suppliers in Belgium. A similar project was noted for jet fuel storage tanks in Cuba. Lansdale noted that the CIA had concluded that its realistic role should be to at least create the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support for it, to improve CIA operational capability, and to help create a climate which will permit provocative actions in support of a shift to overaction. Lansdale wanted them to reevaluate to see whether or not they could make a greater effort. An outline of what the 33 tasks are for each of the entities involved then follows in Lansdale's memo. The memorandum notes that the President directed that the Chief of Operations conduct the project through the appropriate organizations and departments of the government. In this regard the memo notes "Also, CIA apparently believes that its role should be to create and expand a popular

<u>SOURCE:</u>	<u>STAFF:</u>
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u>

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:CARD 3DATES:CATEGORIES:

Card 3 of 3

OCCURRENCE: (continued from Memo for the Special Group re: Cuba Project, Jan. 24, 1962
detectives and foreign police officials." (00106)

In regard to Task #7 of General Lansdale's review this memo notes, "Moreover, the development of a resistance movement will not remain controllable, so that operational time tables produced during the next four weeks can serve only as guides for a proposed sequence of actions." (00107)

The memorandum notes that six men to form the initial nucleus for work for inside Cuba have been assessed in depth. Fifteen locations have been selected as suitable centers for resistance. It was also noted that in support of State's efforts, CIA has conducted propaganda operations including a number of mass demonstrations in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

SOURCE:**TOP SECRET**STAFF:FILE:DATE:

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<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
Halpern Gen Lansdale ✓ Zogby	Oct 1961	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Halpern's
Shortly after his meeting with Bissell, Halpern, and ~~Zogby~~ were introduced to Gen Lansdale who was the new Chief of Operations for an effort to remove ~~in~~ the Castro regime. The initial meeting was concerned with only organizational matters.

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u>	<u>STAFF:</u>
Halpern 6/18/75	Rhea
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u>
	7/1/75

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(1)(c)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
LANSDALE,	Mar 2, 1962 Nov 30, 1961	Special Group <i>Mongoose</i>

OCCURRENCE: Lansdale traces the history of the project from its inception on Nov. 30, 1961 through March 1, 1962. Under the latter date, he notes, "The Chief of Operations /Lansdale/ is to report to the President through the Special Group (NSC 5412 Augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS); the Special Group will be responsible for providing policy guidance for approving important operations, and for monitoring progress." (00181) Lansdale also submitted an intelligence plan for basic intelligence collection upon which to base the decision to undertake actions to cause the overthrow of Castro. The plan itself at pages 00183 through 00187 included establishing intelligence agents inside Cuba; collecting intelligence from Cubans inside the United States; counterfeiting ration cards and currency inside of Cuba; geographical surveys of air fields, military installations, communications centers; attempts to place trained agents inside the government organizations or to defect officials "in place"; and negotiating for British help in contaminating lubricants and fuels to cripple Cuban transportation. "The British want to know, 'How serious are you?', before risking their assets to help the U.S." (00180-00187)

<u>SOURCE:</u> Program review by Brig. Gen. Lansdale, Mar 2, 1962 on the Cuba Project (00180-00187)	<u>STAFF:</u> di Genova
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u> June 30, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LANSDALE, ✓

DATES:

Mar 13, 1962

CATEGORIES:Special Group Augmented
MONGOOSE
*CUBA**Card 1 of 2*

OCCURRENCE: The planning for Operation MONGOOSE was prepared on a format of separate planning for each department and agency involved. Revised planning along that line was submitted with this memorandum. Activities already approved were marked with an asterisk. Approved were dispatching one intelligence agent operation to a key area selected by the CIA, ("Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence collection,...However, CIA has noted that, once the agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort will be made to attempt such control.") (00207), Caribbean Admissions Center Cpa-Locka, Florida. Periodic intelligence estimates, [continued negotiating for British help in contaminating locomotive lubricants], two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba approved for March 16-31, 1962, develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U.S., develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962 in South America and

SOURCE:

Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented
from Lansdale re: Institutional Planning, Operation MONGOOSE,
13 March 1962 (00206-00213)

STAFF

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DATE

JULY 1, 1975

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